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Abstract
The thesis develops theoretical models to examine the effects of air transport
liberalization on the airline industry. The models make use of Nash non cooperative, Stackelberg
and Cournot game models to illustrate how the airline industry is impacted when liberalization in
the form of granting air traffic rights and antitrust immunity to airlines is implemented.
Beginning with the discussion of regulation in the airline industry, the thesis goes on to study the
spread of air transport liberalization in several parts of the world. The effects of liberalization are
analyzed in context of air fares, route operation structure, and strategic behavior of airlines. The
study shows that while it is not clear that liberalization would lead to a decrease in fares in all
routes, it does lead to airlines forming a hub and spoke operation structure, and engenders
incentives among airlines to collude to achieve lower operating costs and higher profits.
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Introduction
It has been more than one hundred years since humankind has learnt how to fly, and
commercial airlines today are one of the biggest industries in the world. This high technology
industry has generated tremendous employment, and has enabled the development of trade and
tourism everywhere. It has also facilitated globalization by the virtue of which we feel as if the
world has become smaller.
For decades, the airline industry remained one of the most regulated industries. The
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 in the United States challenged the age old dogma that
commercial aviation should be tightly regulated and monitored by the government. The act was
followed by a wave of liberalization, and many parts of the world reaped the benefit of handing
over the airlines to market forces. The influence of the government in the airline industry has
sharply declined.
It must be noted that Air Transport Liberalization primarily entails two aspects:
deregulation and privatization. The models in the study will be primarily concerned with
deregulation, specifically in the context of relaxing the ease of entry in the aviation market. Also,
rules and regulations governing the airline industry also pertain to issues related to safety
measures. Airlines have to adhere to such rules established by their home countries. For instance,
all commercial aircraft based in the United States have to follow guidelines set up by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) during takeoff and landing. In the context of this study,
deregulation does not imply the relaxation of such safety measures.
It is interesting to note that relaxing the ease of entry into one’s aviation market has
numerous political complications. For example, a state will not allow aircrafts from its enemy
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state to pass over its territory. Thus, political reasons may take precedence over economic logic
in the airline industry. However, this study will only focus on the economic aspects of airline
deregulation. Inclusion of political considerations may distort the models presented in some
ways.
The airline industry is also dependent on a variety of other geo-political issues. For
instance, sharp rise in oil prices will tremendously increase the cost of airline services, which in
turn will increase air fares. However, the study will exclude the discussion of how such issues
impact the airlines. In addition, liberalization creates several effects, some of which spill over to
other industries. For instance, airline deregulation may create a boom in the tourism industry.
However, the study will only focus on the effect of air transport liberalization on the airline
industry.
The study begins with an overview and discussion of regulation in the airline industry.
The history of regulation in context to air services is also discussed. Liberalization is introduced
in the chronological chain of events as a movement that succeeded regulation. The first and
second chapters primarily serve as a background of the study. Chapter three develops a model to
analyze the effect of liberalization on air fares. The following chapters develop models that
explore the impact of liberalization on operation structure of the carriers, and their strategic
interactions among one another. The conclusion summarizes the key ideas, and indicates how the
models could be used in analyzing the developments in the airline industry.
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Chapter 1: Overview of Economic Regulation in the Airline
Industry
Why regulate?
The airline industry had remained a highly regulated industry until the wave of
liberalization initiated by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) in the United States in 1978.
Following the ADA, several countries adopted liberalization as a strategy to make their
respective airline industries more competitive. Before beginning to analyze the impact that
liberalization has created or is predicted to create, it is important to understand why this industry
was highly regulated by states and international organizations in the first place.
The airline industry has some features that set it apart from other industries. First of all,
airlines serve a non-differentiated, almost homogenous product. The product of a commercial
airline is either transportation of passengers or freight. The service provided by an airline is only
an intermediary; the product is not considered an end in itself. For instance, a tourist wanting to
travel to Budapest will use the services of an airline. However, the air ticket to Budapest cannot
be considered the end product that the tourist is seeking. It is only a means that enables the
tourist to reach the desired destination. Nevertheless, in current times, airlines have made several
endeavors to diversify their product, such as introducing first and business class seats, quality
food and beverage services during the flight. Many airlines have also launched frequent flyer
programs that induce consumer brand loyalty.
Despite such efforts, on the larger scale, airlines can still be considered to be providing an
undifferentiated product, and, consumers prefer competitive prices in this industry compared to
products of other industries. A traveler would be less likely to care about which airline he/she is
5

flying with since all of them provide the same good. Thus, the strongest parameter that
differentiates one airline from the other would be fares. Therefore, the airline industry is
tremendously price competitive.
The airline industry is also considered to be relatively easy to enter. This is because,
unlike other manufacturing industries, aviation does not require the setting up of a factory,
collecting raw materials, transporting the physical product to several places, etc. Furthermore,
marketing an air ticket is much simpler; it does not require the physical transportation of the
material from one location to another.
Due to such features of the airline industry, industrial economists that have historically
favored airline regulation argue that liberalization leads to wasteful competition. Due to the
relative ease of entry, new market entrants can provide substantial competition to existing
carriers. It was also believed that the ease of entry in an unregulated aviation market would allow
it to get saturated and unprofitable in a relatively short period.
Due to price sensitivity in the industry, every carrier would also realize that lower fares
would give it a superior advantage over its rival firms. Price wars would start and airlines would
drive their competitors out of business. The airline would deliberately set lower fares which
would be unprofitable in the short run, but profitable in the long run since, by then, its
competitors would be out of business. In such market conditions, only the airline that would have
long term access to capital would be successful.
In an attempt to lower fares, some held the view that airlines would compromise the
safety of aircrafts. Safety measures comprise a significant proportion of a flight operating
expense. In order to lower fares in a price war, an airline could try to minimize its production
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costs by reducing spending on safety measures. This would increase the chances of accidents
occurring and jeopardize the lives of traveling passengers.
Furthermore, some have considered air transport to be a public utility, or at least a quasipublic utility. Doganis (Flying Off Course, 2002, pages 48-49) argued that the external benefits
arising from civil aviation were such that the industry needed to be regulated in order to ensure
that any benefits were not jeopardized. Apart from purely economic, the benefits of air transport
are also political and social. There are several world regions that cannot be accessed by ground
transportation. In order to keep the population living in these regions connected to the rest of the
world, it is vital that flight services operate there. There may be little profit in operating flights in
such regions. However, the government has the obligation to operate flights there.

If air

transport were to be totally unregulated, private airlines would have little motive to serve
unprofitable regions.
Another reason why regulation was highly imposed in commercial aviation in the past
was the state of aircraft technology. Only with the introduction of jets such as the DC-3 in the
1940s did the airline industry begin to get profitable. Still, productivity was relatively low and
the private sector was considered incapable of entering this industry. In the 1960s, turbo jets led
to a dramatic increase in speed, while aircraft size did not increase appreciably (Doganis, Flying
Off Course, 2002, page 9). The introduction of wide-body fuselages and of Boeing 720B in the
latter period of the 1960s led to the airline industry boom. Such technological advancement
halved the unit costs per available ton kilometer in constant value terms between the 1960s and
70s (Doganis, Flying Off Course, 2002, page 10).
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Historical Regulatory Framework in the Airline Industry
The airline industry has historically been a highly regulated business. This has allowed
several entities such as governments and trade groups to manipulate the industry. Until the
reversal of U.S. aviation policy in 1979, three regulatory systems were prevalent: bilateral air
service agreements, inter-airline pooling agreements and pricing agreements negotiated through
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) (Doganis, Flying Off Course, 2002, page 26).
Also prominent are international agreements such as the Chicago Convention signed in 1944
which formalized the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
The type of regulations considered in the airline industry can be broadly classified under
two categories: economic and non-economic. Economic regulation pertains to airline business
decisions such as market access, fare control, and cap on the number of flights a carrier can
operate. Non economic regulation deals with the set of rules established that ensure standard
safety measures are adopted by airlines. These include licensing rights, aircraft operating
conditions, aviation technical manpower, etc. By deregulation and Air Transport Liberalization,
we only consider the relaxation of economic regulations governing air transport.
The Chicago Convention
Signed by 52 member states in 1944, the Chicago Convention (CC) is one of the most
prominent agreements that govern the airline industry. This multinational agreement is crucial in
three aspects of international air transport: exchange of air traffic rights, fare control and freight
tariffs and the control of flight frequencies and capacity (Doganis, Flying Off Course, 2002, page
30). In addition, the convention also set up the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
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which acts as an intergovernmental agency to provide a forum for the discussion of key aviation
related issues.
Article 1 is the most important feature of the convention with regards to air traffic rights
and states that “the contracting states recognize that every state has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its own territory” (Chicago Convention, 1944, article 1).
Furthermore, Article 6 states that “no scheduled international air service may be operated over or
into the territory of a contracting state, except with the special permission or other authorization
of that state, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization”. Thus, the
convention enforced the doctrine of airspace sovereignty for member states. This also introduced
the concept of traffic rights, which are more popularly called “freedoms in the air”.
Traditionally, there are regarded to be 5 “freedoms in the air”, with the addition of 3
supplementary rights. They are described as follows (Forsyth et al., Preparing ASEAN for open
skies, 2004, pages 126-129):
With respect to Country ‘A’,
First Freedom: The privilege to fly over a treaty partner’s territory (B) without landing.
Second Freedom: The privilege to make a technical landing in a treaty partner’s territory (B)
without picking up or letting off revenue traffic.
Third Freedom: The privilege to carry revenue traffic from the carrier’s national territory (A) to a
treaty partner’s territory (B).
Fourth Freedom: The privilege to carry revenue traffic from a treaty partners territory to the
carriers own territory.
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Fifth Freedom: The privilege to carry revenue traffic between two or more treaty partner nations
(B to C and/or D) on flights operating out of or into a carrier’s national territory (A).
Supplementary rights:
Sixth Freedom: The privilege to carry revenue traffic flown between two treaty partners (B to C)
operating through a carrier’s territory (A).
Seventh Freedom: The privilege to carry revenue traffic flown between the territories of two
nations (B to C) by a carrier operating entirely outside its own territory (A).
Eighth Freedom (Cabotage rights): Continuous cabotage occurs when a foreign carrier flies
between two domestic points in a foreign country and carries domestic passengers between the
two points as an extension of a route originating in its home country whilst discrete cabotage
occurs when there is no connection between the two points and a flight originating in the home
country.
The participants at Chicago did manage to agree on the mutual exchange of the first two
freedoms (Doganis, Flying Off Course, 2002, page 30).
Bilateral Air Service Agreements (ASAs)
Since the Chicago Convention only managed to have member states to agree on the first
two air traffic freedoms, the exchange of other freedoms became a bilateral agreement issue
among countries. These are agreements that one state can have with another for granting carriers
from the other country specific air traffic freedoms. The purpose of such agreements is to control
market access. For instance, country X can sign a bilateral Air Service agreement with country Y
with the terms that any aircraft from country Y will be granted fourth freedom rights. By virtue
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of this agreement, any airline from Y can now carry revenue traffic from any airport in X. Some
bilateral ASAs can also limit the frequency and capacity of flights being operated by
participating parties. These agreements work on the principle of reciprocity, i.e. if X grants Y
fourth freedom rights, then Y must also grant X the same level of rights.
Pooling Agreements
Whereas Bilateral Air Service Agreements take place between two states, Pooling
Agreements can take place between two airlines. These are formal/informal agreements that
enable competing carriers to cooperate with one another to decide on the frequency of flights,
fares, etc. Thus, it is an anti-competitive agreement which serves to the benefit of the firms. In
the years up to the early 1990s, such agreements generally took the form of revenue-sharing
pools, or less frequently, revenue and cost-sharing pools (Doganis, Flying Off Course, 2002,
pages 36-37). Because of anti-trust laws in the United States, pooling agreements on flights
to/from the U.S. were banned. In December 1987, the European council of ministers decided to
make pooling agreements illegal under the “First Package” on air transport liberalization.
IATA
Founded in Havana in 1945, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) has
remained an important institution that has pursued the interests of its member airlines. IATA
annually publishes key statistics about the aviation industry and conducts research. It provides a
counterbalance to ICAO, an intergovernmental organization established during the Chicago
Convention. Another important function of the organization is to manage the operation of the
Clearing House that settles inter airline debts arising from inter airline traffic. Such debts arise
when one airline provides services to passengers that hold tickets of another airline. Today, 240
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airlines are members of IATA, and they collectively account for 84% of total air traffic
(iata.org).
IATA was formed with the objective of acting as a supply cartel for airlines. Historically,
the organization was involved in setting fares and cargo rates for member carriers. Until 1979,
the process for establishing fares involved the so-called Traffic Conferences, one covering North
and South America, the second covering Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and the third the
Pacific region and Australasia (Doganis, Flying Off Course, 2002, page 40). Fares had to be
agreed unanimously, and any member airline had the right to veto against the proposition passed
by other members. The overall objective of the organization was to make pricing decisions for
the industry in such a way as to maximize profits for all. It was also argued that the IATA Traffic
Conference system safeguarded consumer interest because it banned capacity regulation, which
would have allowed airlines to extract monopoly profits. If firms are allowed to fix both prices
and output levels, they can adjust both to extract the most amount of profit at the expense of the
consumer. However, capacity regulation ban prevented airlines from setting output.
Although the system had some benefits, the fare setting regime became largely rigid to
deal with developments in the aviation industry. With liberalization, IATA’s influence declined
sharply.
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Chapter 2: History and Spread of Air Transport Liberalization
History of Air Transport Liberalization
Air Transport Liberalization was first achieved in the United States by the Airline
Deregulation Act in 1978. In the early 1970s, the pressure to liberalize the airline industry had
piled up. By then, scheduled regulated carriers were facing enormous competition from nonscheduled charter airline operators. Non scheduled operators had the advantage of being flexible
in their flight operations since they did not fall under any regulatory system. Furthermore,
several Asian Airlines such as Garuda Indonesia, Singapore Airlines and Malaysian Airlines
started launching fares that were outside the IATA tariff system. By offering service standards
well above those specified by IATA, they were capturing a growing share of scheduled traffic on
trans-Pacific routes and on services from East Asia to Europe (Doganis, Flying Off Course,
2002, page 50) and IATA was increasingly losing its influence.
The first monumental step taken towards Air Transport Liberalization in the United
States was the Kennedy Report published in 1976. The report, under the leadership of Senator
Edward Kennedy concluded that “the airline industry is potentially highly competitive, but the
Civil Aeronautics Board’s system of regulation discourages the airlines from competing in price
and virtually forecloses new firms from entering the industry. The result is high fares and
security for existing firms. But the result does not mean high profits. Instead, airlines – prevented
from competing in price – simply channeled their competitive energies toward costlier service:
more flights, more planes, more frills… The remedy is for the Civil Aeronautics Board to allow
both new and existing firms greater freedom to lower fares and…to obtain new
routes.”(Dempsey et al., Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology, 1992, page 176).
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By 1978, committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives were working
on draft versions of bills to reform airline regulation. On October 24, 1978, in the closing hours
of the 95th Congress, Democrat James E. (Jimmy) Carter, signed into law the Airline
Deregulation Act (ADA), which proposed a gradual shutting-down of the airline industry’s
regulatory incubator, including the demise of the CAB itself in 1985 (Havel, Beyond Open Skies,
2009, page 252). The primary proposals under the ADA were as follows (Doganis, Flying Off
Course, 2002, page 52):
1. An end to all controls over domestic routes and fares. Thus, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) was eventually eliminated in 1985.
2. Relaxation of charter rules, as were limits on the right of scheduled carriers to operate
charters.
3. Revision of US aviation policies with other countries.
The revision of US aviation policies with other states initiated the open market phase of
liberalization and introduced the concept of “Open Skies”.
Introduction of Open Market and Open Skies Aviation Policy
Open market aviation policy implies the relaxation of bilateral and multilateral air traffic
agreements among states to allow more market access for airlines from states participating in the
agreement. The revision of the US-Netherlands air services agreement signed in March 1978
became the trendsetter for subsequent ‘open market’ bilateral. The key terms of the agreement
are as follows (Doganis, Flying Off Course, 2002, page 53):
1. Multiple designation accepted (i.e. more than one airline from each country)
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2. US airlines given unlimited authority from any points in the US via intermediate
points to Amsterdam and points beyond, with full traffic rights.
3. Dutch airlines given only five points in the United States.
4. No capacity or frequency restrictions.
5. No restrictions on sixth-freedom traffic.
6. Unlimited charter rights between any points in either territory.
7. Country-of-origin rules for scheduled tariffs (i.e. each government to set its own
rules for tariffs originating in its own country).
The US-Netherlands open market policy amendments were followed by similar
negotiations with Belgium, Germany and Singapore. The open market bilateral still had some
restrictions on flight operations, for instance Dutch airlines were given only five points in the
US. Thus, open market bilateral eventually evolved into open skies bilateral agreements. In
September 1992, the Dutch and the US governments signed what was effectively the first “Open
Skies” agreement. The key features of the agreement were as follows (Doganis, Flying Off
Course, 2002, page 62):
1. Open route access – airlines from either country can fly to any point in the other with
full traffic rights.
2. Unlimited fifth-freedom rights.
3. No tariff controls.
4. Airlines free to code share or make other commercial agreements.
5. Break of gauge permitted.
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Liberalization Spreads
Europe
Upon realizing the effects of airline deregulation in the US, consumer pressure for
liberalization was building up throughout the 1980s in Europe. Just like the US, countries in
Europe revised their bilateral air service negotiations. In addition, Europe went through
multilateral negotiation that was initiated by the European Court of Justice and the European
Commission.
When the United Kingdom revised its bilateral air service agreements with the
Netherlands in June 1984, it became the first bilateral deregulatory act between two European
states. Later that year, the UK renegotiated agreements with Germany, Luxembourg, France,
Belgium, Switzerland and Ireland. Soon, other European states followed up on the UK’s
footsteps. It was not until the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 that the
transformative phase in EU air transport policy commenced, beginning a decade-long transition
to become Europe’s “Single Aviation Market” (Havel, In Search of Open Skies, 1997, page 101).
The ‘December 1987 Package’ of measures, agreed at that time by the European Council of
Ministers was the first significant step towards liberalization of air transport policy in the
continent (Doganis, Flying Off Course, 2002, page 55).
With the virtue of the Package, the competition laws that were mentioned in the Treaty of
Rome could now be applied to the airline industry. This called for greater liberalization of the
industry to make it more competitive, which led to the abandonment of revenue-pooling
agreements among European airlines. It also led to the nullifying of inter-airline agreements that
dealt with capacity planning and pricing. Following the 1987 package, a new set of rules came
into existence in 1990 that further liberalized the aviation market in Europe. The final package
16

came into existence in 1992. It allowed for total pricing freedom for all European carriers. The
air transport deregulation procedures outlined thereafter implied an end to the national rulemaking power; EU states could no longer bar carriers from other EU states to enter their market.
The single aviation market removed all commercial restrictions for flying regulated by national
governments within the EU and transformed the air transport industry by creating conditions for
international competitiveness (Maho Kawagoe, Air Transport Deregulation in EU, 2008, page
169).
Other parts of the World
After air transport liberalization was achieved in the US and Europe, several countries in
the Middle East and Asia followed a similar trend. With regards to the Middle East, Air
Transport liberalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is notable. The GCC comprises
of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. All nations in the
GCC except Saudi Arabia have signed some form of open skies agreement (World Bank,
Economic Integration in the GCC, 2010, page 11). The GCC states have also witnessed a
tremendous growth in their aviation industry. Many airlines in the region have adopted a hub and
spoke system, which was possible due to liberalization. This will be discussed in more detail
later.
In Australia in 1987 a new government aviation policy reaffirmed Qantas’s continued
role as the country’s sole designated international carrier but announced the complete
deregulation of domestic air services from October 1990 (Doganis, Flying Off Course, 2002,
page 56). Such deregulatory initiatives imply that the government will stop interfering in
regulating domestic fares and frequency of flights.
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With regards to Asia, in Japan, JAL’s (Japan Airlines) effective monopoly of
international air services was broken when from 1986 onwards a domestic carrier, All Nippon
Airways (ANA) was designated as the second Japanese carrier on a number of key destinations
(Doganis, Flying Off Course, 2002, page 56). The adoption of Open Skies policy among the
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) countries Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore,
Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia and Brunei has been the topic of
much discussion recently. ASEAN open skies agreement aims to create a single aviation market
in South East Asia by 2020, the likes of which would be similar to the EU single aviation market.
ASEAN Open Skies
A multilateral open skies agreement among the ten ASEAN states has been the topic of
much discussion in recent times. The ASEAN nations vary tremendously in terms of their
economic structures. Such difference is also manifested in their respective aviation industries.
Aviation markets remain limited in countries such as Laos and Cambodia with per capita
incomes of $417 and $311 respectively. While Brunei and Singapore have small population
bases, their high per capita incomes make their citizens a large source of intra ASEAN travel.
Large domestic aviation markets characterize middle-income states, namely Indonesia,
Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia (Forsyth et al., Preparing ASEAN for Open sky, 2004, page
71). Given these differences, a common aviation market in the region will affect the member
states in different ways.
With the realization that cooperation and advances towards economic integration would
prove beneficial to member states, ASEAN was formed in 1967. In 1997, the ASEAN council
prepared the ‘ASEAN 2020’ vision, a set of policies and reforms aimed at creating closer
economic integration in the region by 2020. As part of the plan to forge economic cooperation,
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member states realized that there must exist a multilateral open skies agreement, which would
provide unrestricted access for airlines of an ASEAN member state to operate flights in the
region. The only other place in the world where such a package was passed was the EU. The
ASEAN Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Air Freight Services signed in September
2002 was the first step towards the full liberalization of air freight services in ASEAN. A
meeting held in Ho Chi Minh City in 2004 produced a draft outline for the ASEAN Action Plan
for the implementation of Open Skies. The following was the timetable for reform (Forsyth et al.,
Open Skies in ASEAN, Journal of Air Transport Management, 2006, pages 143-152):
Phase 1 (2005-2007) - double designation, move to substantial ASEAN ownership;
unlimited 3rd and 4th freedom within ASEAN; and opening of secondary gateways.
Phase 2 (2008-2010) - Multiple designation; restricted 5th freedom beyond rights;
completion of opening up of gateways, remove restrictions on fares.
Phase 3 (2011-2012) - Principal place of business for ownership; 5th freedom within
ASEAN; possible 7th freedom within ASEAN, charter liberalization.
While Open Sky is targeted to be implemented by 2015, the above reforms were simply
steps that would facilitate for a smoother transition to a multilateral common aviation area.
However, some member states failed to achieve the targeted goals, as a result of which they may
not implement the open skies agreement. Indonesia in 2010 declared that it is not ready to
implement open skies by 2015 (chinapost.com).
The development of Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) is an aspect that will be tremendously
affected by the agreement. An example of an LCC in ASEAN is Air Asia. From an airline with
two aircraft plying six routes in Malaysia in January 2002, AirAsia has soared in the last nine
19

years to cover 65 destinations in 18 countries (AirAsia.com). The no-frills airline offers
economical packages that have made air travel affordable to many. LCCs cannot operate under a
strict regulatory regime that controls fares. Due to liberalization, their business model has
prospered. An open sky environment in ASEAN will support the growth of LCCs. An example is
the Singapore-Kuala Lumpur air sector which was liberalized in December 2008 to allow lowcost carriers in. From US$400 for a 45-minute return flight, fares — with all taxes and
surcharges included — are now as low as less than US$100. Passenger traffic on the route also
jumped by 34 percent last year compared with 2008, benefiting businesses all round
(chinapost.com).
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Chapter 3: Analysis of the Impact of Air Transport
Liberalization on Fares
Research has shown that Airline Liberalization leads to the reduction of fares. The benefit
of increased competition that accrues as a result of giving wider market access to more airlines
has led to a general increase in consumer surplus. However, it is not clear if liberalization leads
to the decrease in fares in all markets. It is also not certain whether the fare reduction remains
permanent. This section begins with literature review of some publications that deal with the
effect of liberalization on air fares. It is followed by a model that makes use of game theory to
illustrate how fares are affected when a regulated market is liberalized and market access is
granted to more carriers.

Literature Review:
“Economic Effects of Airline Deregulation” –Morrison, Winston
Morrison and Winston devised a way of capturing the effect of deregulation on air fares
by constructing a fare deflator based on the relationship between fares, input prices, and output
characteristics during the deregulated years of 1980-82. Since air fares depend on a wide array of
global events such as oil prices, the authors used this technique to hold control for these variables
and to solely observe the impact of liberalization on fares.
Specifically [the authors] estimate a pooled cross-section regression that relates average
fare (revenue divided by passengers) to: the price of fuel (cents per gallon), average wages
(dollars per year), average passenger trip distance (miles), and service quality (average number
of weekly departures per city served) (Morrison, Winston, 1986, page 13). Using this method,
the deflator is found by:
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= 1.93
The 1983 deregulated fares are then deflated by this amount to obtain estimates of 1977
deregulated fares. Now, comparison can be made between the estimated deregulated fares in
1977 and the actual fares that were prevalent then, under regulation. The results are summarized
as follows:

Table 1: Actual Fares and Predicted Deregulated Round Trip Fares, Selected Routes
1977, in US dollars (Morrison, Winston, The Economic Effects of Airline Deregulation, 1986,
page 16).
Thus, it is not clear that deregulation caused fares to fall in all markets. This result is
contradictory to the claims of early advocates of airline deregulation, such as Douglas and
Miller, who had predicted that deregulation would benefit travelers because fares would fall,
although service quality would also decrease. Morrison and Winston claim that fares fall only in
high density markets where there is more potential for competition among carriers.
“The Impact of International Air Service Liberalization on the UAE” –InterVISTAS
The UAE (United Arab Emirates) is one of the leading aviation markets, and much of this
success may be attributed to liberalization. To date, the UAE has signed open skies agreements
with countries such as Egypt, the United States, Singapore, Spain, Luxembourg, Eritrea, and
others. In other cases, the ASAs have been liberalized but stopped short of open skies. For
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example, the agreement with the UK allows unrestricted capacity but still maintains restrictions
on pricing and fifth freedom rights.
InterVISTAS group developed a gravity model to capture the impact of market
liberalization in the aviation industry. The model has been used to analyze the impact of air
service liberalization in several countries. InterVISTAS describes the model as follows:
TrafficAB = F(GDPAB, ServiceTradeAB, InterveningAB, ASAFactors(0,1)AB)
Where,
TrafficAB is the total Origin/Destination (O/D) passenger traffic between countries A
and B in both directions.
GDPAB is the product of the GDP of the two countries, capturing their economic size.
ServiceTradeAB is the total amount of trade in service (i.e., not goods) between the two
countries in U.S. dollars.
InterveningAB captures the intervening opportunities for closer travel than between two
countries. Traffic between two countries was found to be less if there were opportunities
for travel to closer countries. The intervening variable is calculated as an index of the
sum of GDPs of every country that is 10% or less distant than the distance between
countries A and B.
ASAFactors(0,1)AB are dummy variables capturing the presence or absence of a specific
restrictions on the ASA. For example, if ASA allows flights only to certain restricted points, the
dummy variable takes the value 1.
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The gravity model can only estimate changes in traffic. However, the benefit of fare
reduction was calculated on the assumption that traffic generation is primarily due to fare
reduction. In estimating the fare reduction, it was further assumed that on country pairs which
already had direct service prior to liberalization, all of the traffic stimulation was attributable to
fare reductions; while on country pairs that did not previously have direct service, two-thirds of
traffic increase was attributable to fare reductions (one third was attributable to improved service
levels – direct service, increased frequency, etc.) (InterVISTAS, 2009, page 34). The following
table summarizes their findings:

Table 2: Fare Impact and Consumer Surplus Benefits of Liberalization (InterVISTAS,
The Impact of International Air Service Liberalization on the UAE, 2009, page 33)
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Modeling the effect of Airline Liberalization on fares using Game Theory
Consider a non-liberalized market served by only one carrier and denote it Player 1, or
P1. The market is liberalized and the possibility arises for a second and a third player to enter the
market. We model airline behavior by using a two- stage Nash non-cooperative simultaneous
game. Consider a case where liberalization takes place in an unsaturated high density market that
has high market potential. If neither P2 nor P3 enter the market, both will not get any gain.
Thus, we denote their payoff by 0. If one airline enters the market and another does not, the
airline that does not enter the market will not get any gain, thus getting a zero payoff. However,
for the airline entering the market, its pricing decision can be broadly classified into two
categories. It could either charge lower fares than the existing market fare at the non-liberalized
market, or it could charge a fare which is same or higher than the existing market fare. We will
assume that the firm is least likely to charge a higher fare, since by doing so it will not be able to
compete with the existing carrier, P1. However, in reality, this assumption can be challenged as
the newer carrier may provide better services and charge higher fares. Note that we have
assumed in our model that an airline service is a homogenous product.
P2\P3
Don’t Enter
Enter

Don’t Enter
0,0
__,0

Enter
0, __
__,__

Table 3: Simultaneous game between P2 and P3 in relation to entering the market
If either P2 or P3 charge a lower fare lower than the existing fare of P1, they will attract
more passengers and get a higher payoff. If, however, they charge the same fare as P1, their
payoff will not be as high as it would have been had they set lower fares. Thus, we assign a
payoff of 10 for the airlines if they set a low fare and a payoff of 5 if they set the same fare as P1.
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These values are arbitrary; what matters is that one is larger than the other and that they represent
net profit.

Same
e

5

P2 (or P3)
Low

10

Figure 1: Pay off choice for P2 or P3
If both P2 and P3 enter the market, payoffs will be determined by a second simultaneous
game, represented in Table XX:
P2\P3
Same
Low

Same
3,3
10,2

Low
2,10
5,5

Table 4: Payoffs for P2 and P3 in regards to setting the same/ lower fares
If both P2 and P3 set a fare that is same as P1, then they will both get an equal payoff.
However, their payoff will be lower, since they are competing with P1. If P2 or P3 sets a low
fare and the other sets a fare equal to P1, the airline setting the low fare will have a competitive
advantage and thus will have a higher payoff. If both airlines set a low price, they will both have
an advantage over P1. However, since P2 and P3 will be competing against each other, they will
both earn a relatively low payoff, but still higher than when they had higher fares. The Nash
Equilibrium of the second simultaneous game is:
NEP2, P3 = [Low, Low]
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Using the results of the second simultaneous game and pricing decision of P2 and P3, we
can now complete the payoffs for the first simultaneous game as follows:
P2\P3
Don’t Enter
Enter

Don’t Enter
0,0
10, 0

Enter
0, 10
5, 5

Table 5: Payoffs for P2 and P3
The Nash Equilibrium for the game is NEP2, P3 = [Enter, Enter].
Hence, the game shows that both P2 and P3 enter the market and set low fares.
Now, consider the case when liberalization takes place on a low density sector that has
little market potential. Since liberalization has taken place in both markets, it will be beneficial
for the airline to focus on the profit making sector. Due to liberalization, airlines now have the
freedom to exit the loss making sector. This sector is less profitable. We analyze the behavior of
airlines with regards to exiting the less profitable sector by constructing the following
simultaneous game:
Px\Py
Exit
Don’t Exit

Exit
2,2
10,4

Don’t Exit
4,10
0,0

Table 6: Payoffs for players in regards to exiting/ not exiting the market.
If the airlines exit the less lucrative sector, they have a positive payoff since they can now
employ the resources to the profit making sector. However, if they do not exit, they will not
experience the fruits of the liberalized profit making sector.
If one airline exits and the other do not, the airline that exits will get a positive payoff
since it can employ its resources to the more profitable sector. Ceteris Paribus, since the other
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airline does not exit the loss making sector, the airline exiting the loss making sector will be
facing less competition on the other route, thus it gets a payoff of 4. If one of the airlines exits
and the other does not, the airline that does not exit the market will have a monopoly power and
hence gets a high payoff of 10. The Nash Equilibrium is as follows:
NE1 = [Exit, Don’t Exit], NE2 = [Don’t Exit, Exit]
In this game, one airline exits while the other does not. As a result, we will see a
monopoly arising in the market, which could lead to a rise in fares.
The game theoretic analysis shows that while in some markets deregulation leads to the
fall in fares, in others fares might increase.
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Chapter 4: Analysis of the Impact of Air Transport
Liberalization on Operations Structure
Air Transport Liberalization has enabled airlines to adopt a more cost efficient operating
structure for maximizing profit. From the traditional point to point flight operation layout,
airlines have adopted the hub and spoke regime. The hub and spoke regime is characterized by
the flight routing structure in which multiple locations are linked to a central hub. Passengers are
usually required to transfer to another aircraft at the hub, and proceed with their journey to the
final destination. This section begins with a review of some research conducted on this topic, and
is followed by a model which describes how operation structure of airlines are affected when air
traffic rights are granted to carriers.

Literature Review:
“Economic Effects of Airline Deregulation” –Morrison, Winston
Morrison and Winston illustrate the economic rationale for airlines to adopt a hub and
spoke system by comparing the costs involved in operating non-stop flights versus hub-andspoke operations. Their analysis is presented as follows:
(From Morrison, Winston, 6-7):
Figure 2: Simple Transportation
Network
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Suppose the carrier serves route 1 (A to C), supplying output Y1 (measured in
passengers), and route 2 (B to C), providing output Y2. For simplicity, there is assumed to be no
traffic between A and B. The carrier has two routing options: nonstop routing, whereby traffic on
each route is handled independently, and hub-and-spoke routing, whereby traffic originating
from A destined for C is routed through B and combined with traffic originating at B destined for
C.
The criterion for adopting a hub-and-spoke route structure, based on profit-maximizing
behavior, is whether the cost saving from producing output 1 independently, exceeds the possible
loss in revenue resulting from decreased passenger demand for the connecting flight A to B to C.
More formally, the choice of routing operation can be determined by examining the relevant
profit equations. The profit equation corresponding to the nonstop alternative is:
= P1Y1 + P2Y2 – C (Y1, O) – C(O, Y2);
The profit equation corresponding to hub-and-spoke alternative is:
= P1Y*1 + P2Y2 – C (Y*1, Y2),
where Pi denotes Price in market i (assumed constant across alternatives), C(.) denotes total cost,
Y*1 denotes output from market 1 when routing traffic through the hub, and Y*1 ≤ Y1 because
hub-and-spoke practices will increase travel time for traffic originating at A and thus possibly
reduce demand. A hub and spoke is desirable if the cost saving from producing output 1 jointly
with output 2 (as opposed to producing output 1 independently) exceeds the possible loss in
revenue.
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“The rise of the Arabian Gulf carriers: An insight into the business model of Emirates Airline”
-John F. O’Connell
The success of Middle Eastern Airlines such as Emirates Airline, Qatar Airways and
Etihad Airways is laudable. In an age of intense competition in the aviation industry brought
about by market liberalization, these carriers have been able to adapt to the evolving ways of the
industry. For instance, Emirates Airlines has been profitable for the last 20 years, and by
2007/08, had become the world’s fifth most profitable airline with net profits of $843 million. It
had one of the highest operating margins of full service airlines, earning 11.6% in 2007/08
(Emirates Financial Statistics, 2007/08). In 2008, its traffic increased faster than its ability to add
capacity, which resulted in its passenger load factor rising by 3.6% to an impressive 80%. By
mid 2008, Emirates was operating an all wide-body fleet of 109 aircraft with a further 195 on
order (Connell, 2011, pages 339-346). The home airports of these carriers have also experienced
tremendous traffic growth. This paper studies how Emirates airlines’ adoption of a hub-andspoke flight operation structure enabled it to become more competitive. Such strategy was made
possible due to the several open skies and open market agreements the UAE has signed with
other states.
Hub-and-spoke operation enables a number of cities to be connected via a central hub.
This allows passengers from such cities to travel between one another, even in the absence of a
bilateral air service agreement between their respective countries. For instance, if city A and city
B are connected to hub X such that country A and Country B do not share air traffic rights, but
both countries share traffic rights with country X, then passengers will be travel from A to B or
vice-versa by transiting through X. Here the necessary condition of course, is that X must have
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6th freedom rights (The privilege to carry revenue traffic flown between two treaty partners
operating through a carrier’s territory) with both A and B.

Since the UAE has bilateral agreements with places such as the UK and India, Dubai has
proved to be a successful hub for Emirates. Over two million passengers travel annually between
India and the UK. The most recent bilateral air service agreement between the countries capped
the number of weekly services for UK registered airlines operating from London Heathrow to
India’s two major gateways of Mumbai and New Delhi at 112, which is restrictive considering
around 70% of India’s domestic and international passenger traffic goes through these two major
cities. This provides opportunities for the Gulf based carriers to capitalize on their 6th freedom
traffic rights and move Indian traffic through their hubs to the UK market. Marketing
Information Data Transfer (MIDT) shows that 62% of the traffic departing from India towards
the UK is carried on direct flights shared between Jet Airways, British Airways, Air India and
Virgin Atlantic. Emirates, however, has been growing its share of the UK and India markets with
a 13% market share, as it connects ten cities in India and five in the UK via its Dubai hub.
(Connell, 2011).

A Model to describe the impact of Air Transport liberalization on Operation
Structure
To analyze how Air Transport Liberalization in terms of a country giving another country
air traffic rights affects the structure of the market, we will assume that flights operate between
three countries: A, B and C. Assume that each of A, B and C have their respective carriers PA, PB
and PC.
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Before liberalizing the market, assume PA can go from A to B, from A to C and viceversa. Thus, it is possible for passengers to travel from B to C by transiting through A, i.e. by
flying from B to A and then from A to C. Similarly, passengers can go from C to B in the same
way. In the same way, PC can go from C to B and vice-versa, and C to A and vice-versa. Thus,
passengers can travel to A from B by transiting through C. Also, PB can go from B to A and viceversa, and B to C and vice-versa. However, PA cannot fly directly from B to C, PB cannot go
directly from A to C and PC cannot go directly from B to A. This information is represented in
Figure X.

Figure 3: Vector of routes between A, B and C before liberalization
Suppose that B declares open skies with A and grants carriers from A sixth and seventh
air traffic rights. The agreement is reciprocal, so carriers from B are granted sixth and seventh air
traffic rights for operating flights through A. Assume further that C still has a non-liberalized
market. Thus, there is less degree of competition in flights to and from C. Now, as the following
figure shows, there are more alternatives for passengers to travel from A to C and B to C and
vice-versa. It is interesting to note that since A and B have declared open skies with each other,
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the airline market for C, a non-liberalized market is also affected. More alternatives for
passengers to travel from C to B and C to A may make the market more competitive and reduce
the fares on these routes. However, this depends on a range of other factors which will not be
analyzed here.

Figure 4: Vector of routes between A, B and C after liberalization
Therefore, we see that Air Transport Liberalization affects those markets that have not
been liberalized.
What happens to the market over time? Consider the case of airline P B. For simplicity,
assume that PB has one 100 passenger jet and operates sold-out flights from B to C, A to C and B
to A. Each of the routes has 100 passengers respectively. In this non-stop routing option, 3
flights have to be carried out (if we consider flights as a vector of displacement between two
points).
Due to liberalization, there occurs the possibility of developing a hub-and-spoke routing
option. The incentive behind this is explained as follows:
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For the purpose of cost minimization, the airline would be better off operating a fewer
number of flights, but providing service to the same amount of passengers. Suppose that PB
purchases a 200 seat jet. .PB has the option of flying from B to A with 200 passengers, 100 of
which actually wanting to go from B to C but are flying via A as a layover. When 100 passengers
get off at A, this allows seats to be available for 100 more from A to C. Thus, by operating only
2 flights, PB can provide equivalent service for 3 routes. The same applies for P A. B will be
allowed to make A as its hub. After adoption of the hub and spoke system, air traffic resembles
Figure 5:

Figure 5: Vector of routes between A, B and C over time after liberalization
Cost savings of this new structure arise from economies of scope and result when
economies of aircraft size are greater than the cost of rerouting traffic (Morrison, Winston, The
Economic Effects of Airline Deregulation, 1986, page 7). Economies of size derive from more
efficient use of labor and fuel associated with larger aircraft, and, because of particular airline
labor practices and aircraft aerodynamics, are considerable (Bailey, Graham, Deregulating the
Airlines, 1985, page 51).
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Chapter 5: Analysis of the Impact of Airline Liberalization on
the Strategic Behavior of Airlines
Air Transport Liberalization relaxed antitrust laws that allow airlines to collude. As a
result, tremendous increases in airline alliances have been seen in recent times. This section
begins with the review of published research about the effects of airline alliances. It is followed
by a model that uses the proof of a theorem from Sherali et al. Note that although a sketch of the
proof is provided, the theorem is used to support the major theory in this section.

Literature Review:
“The Price Effects of International Airline Alliances” -Jan K. Brueckner and W. Tom Whalen
Using statistical analysis, the research studies the effect of international airline alliances
on fares. The authors compare non alliance fares with inter airline fares and demonstrate that
alliance partners charge interline fares that are approximately 25 percent below those charged by
non allied carriers. According to the theoretical model, the main source of this fare reduction is
the internalization of a negative externality that arises from the uncoordinated choice of interline
‘‘subfares’’ in the absence of an alliance (Brueckner, Whalen, page 505).
Alliances provide airlines the advantage of overcoming restrictions on service imposed
by bilateral air service agreements. For instance, there is a demand for passengers to travel from
country A to B, and bilateral air service agreement restricts an airline from A to travel to B. In
this case, the airline from A can set up an agreement with an airline of country X, which is
between A and B, and has unrestricted traffic rights between both countries. Under the terms of
the agreement, airline A would route its passengers through X, and have them board X’s airline
from the journey from X to B. Such an agreement between the carriers of A and X is known as
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code sharing. It is only possible if the two airlines are participating in an alliance. Thus being in
an alliance provides the airlines the advantage of greater market access. Had there been no code
sharing between the two carriers, passengers would have to divide their journey into 2 parts: A to
X and X to B, and purchase tickets for them separately. The authors argue that in fares in this
uncoordinated regime are higher than if an alliance is present.
Furthermore, by coordinating ﬂight schedules and ensuring gate proximity at connecting
airports, alliance partners can offer greater convenience to the passenger. Alliance travel thus
resembles on-line (single-airline) service, avoiding many of the inconveniences of a traditional
interline trip. This effect, which attracts passengers away from non-allied carriers, is reinforced
by the uniﬁcation of the partners’ frequent-ﬂier programs (Brueckner, Whalen, page 506). While
alliances stem from the lack of open skies agreements between countries, their formation is
possible due to antitrust immunity, which comes about due to liberalization. Thus, a highly
regulated airline industry would not sustain alliances.
The second advantage of an alliance lies in the realm of pricing. Since the major alliances
enjoy antitrust immunity, alliance partners can engage in cooperative pricing of interline trips.
By contrast, pricing of traditional interline travel is best viewed as the result of non-cooperative
behavior. Because of this difference, the theory predicts that the interline fares charged by
alliance partners are lower than those of non-allied carriers. Thus, in addition to offering greater
passenger convenience than a traditional interline trip, alliance travel is more attractively priced
(Brueckner, Whalen, page 510).
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Modeling the Strategic Behavior of Airlines using Stackelberg and Cournot
Firm models:
The ease of access to the market created by airline liberalization allows more airlines to start
operating flights on the liberalized route. Assume that airline liberalization also grants the
operating carriers antitrust immunity. Market conditions will create enough incentives for two or
more firms to collude against the rest. In the model, assume P1 and P2 collude against P3 and
P4. Due to the collusive forces at play, 2 distinct kinds of firms will be created in the market:
1) Stackelberg Firm: It is the less naïve firm that knows the performance function of the
others (Sherali et al., Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and
Computations, 1982, page 256). It explicitly considers the reaction of the other airlines to
its output variations.
2) Cournot Firm: It attempts to maximize its individual profit under the Cournot assumption
that the remaining firms will hold their output at their existing levels (Sherali et al., page
257).
The collusion of P1 and P2 resembles a Stackelberg firm; P3 and P4 are Cournot firms.
However, it must be noted that the degree to which the colluded P1 and P2 resembles a
Stackelberg firm depends on how much they know about the performance function of other
firms. Similarly, the extent to which P3 and P4 resemble Cournot firm depends on their
proximity to the Cournot assumption.
The collusion of P1 and P2 enables them to share information. Due to the accumulation of
information, the colluded firm resembles the Stackelberg firm. Furthermore, from Clarke
(Collusion and the incentives for information sharing, 1983), we have mathematical evidence to
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claim that profits will be higher for firms that share information. Due to market liberalization,
cooperative quantity setting becomes possible. This creates the incentive to share because
comparing industry profits under private information
information play

, with industry profits under shared

, calculations show that:
(Clarke, 1983)

Thus, collusion leads to sharing of information, and by the virtue of shared information,
profits are higher. Information sharing also leads to the colluded firm resembling the Stackelberg
firm. The Stackelberg firm has an advantage over the Cournot firm because of the following
claim:
Proposition: The net operating cost is less than or equal to the net operating cost had the
Stackelberg firm have chosen to be a Cournot firm.
Proof:
Initially, let us represent the net operating cost of carrier ‘j’ by using the following performance
function:

Where Gj is the aggregate cost of operating flights on route l, from locations A to B. Vj is the
frequency of flights on route l.

is the catch all variable that represents factors such as oil prices,

etc. qj is the quantity of passengers for carrier j on route l. fj is the fare per passenger.
Vj has a positive correlation with aggregate costs. qj and fj have inverse relations among
themselves due to the law of demand.
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From Sherali et al (1982),
Say, for Cournot firm 3, let f3(q3) be the total cost of supplying q3 units of the product (In
our case, it is V3 flights. Cost is given as

). After collusion, we assume a

Stackelberg firm, denoted by Pc. Let f(x) represent the total cost of supplying x units of the
product (in our case, Vc flights).
For a given V ≥ 0, let [q3 (v), q4 (v)] be a set of quantities, such that for each individual
P3 and P4, it turns out that qi = qi (v) solves the following:
{fi(qi) – qiP[qi + V + qj(v)]
Then, a set of quantities (x*, q3, q4) is set to be Stackelberg Nash-Cournot equilibrium if
x* solves:

{f(x) – xP(x + q3(x) + q4(x)}……………….Lemma 1.0

Using Lemma 1.0,
Say, x* solves the problem and say (

,

q3, q4) is the Nash-Cournot-equilibrium for the 1-

Stackelberg and 2-Cournot firm oligopoly. Now,
solves:

f(x) – xP [x + q3( ) + q4( )]

But since x* solves sub-game perfect, we must have:

{f(x*) –x*P[x* + q(x*)]} ≤ {f( ) - P [ + q( )]}

QED
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Thus, in a liberalized market, there is strong incentive for airlines to collude.
Here, it must be realized that airlines have an incentive to collude with only those other
airlines with whom they have a potential of gaining from the collusive agreement. One way in
which the collusion described in the model could take place in reality would be by the formation
of airline alliances. Alliances allow the member airlines to share information and act together in
the market as a single dominating entity. The sharing of information gives them a distinct
advantage over those firms that do not collude and have knowledge only about their own
respective performance functions. In addition, as discussed in the literature review, joining an
alliance also allows the member airlines to gain access to more markets. The carriers that will be
unsuccessful to join an alliance due to their own limitations will remain as Cournot firms in the
market.
Due to the collusive forces engendered as a result of air transport liberalization, airlines
might implement a joint fare setting regime like those in cartels. Such anti-competitive forces
may lead to an increase in fares, and thus the results of the first model would be violated.
However, in the presence of Cournot firms that do not participate in the collusive agreement, and
set fares on their own, such events would not take place. This is because when the colluded firms
set higher fares, the non participants of the collusion would become more price competitive.
Since we rely on the assumption that airline services are homogenous, consumers would use the
services of the Cournot firms and thus the Stackelberg firms would face a loss making condition.
Furthermore, the second model suggests that due to the adoption of hub and spoke
regime, liberalization affects other non liberalized markets as well. In other words, the impact of
liberalization is not just limited to the markets that have been liberalized. Thus, if colluded firms
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set higher fares, airlines from other liberalized markets may take advantage of the situation by
operating flights with lower fares in the route in which higher fares have been implemented by
the colluded firms. This would again make the high fare regime of the colluded firms to not last
long.
However, in the extreme case of events where all airlines join the collusive agreement, no
Cournot firms would be left. As a result, joint price as well as quantity setting would become
possible. Such a regime would be reminiscent of the past when IATA acted as a supply cartel in
the airline industry. Such a situation would be rare because in a liberalized market, where airlines
are free to make whatever economic decisions they want, there would arise an incentive to cheat
on the agreement. The carrier that cheats on the agreement would set lower fares, and would thus
have a tremendous price advantage over the rest of the members of the agreement. As a result,
such a collusive agreement would not last long.
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Conclusion
The study developed models to describe the impact of air transport liberalization on the
airline industry with regards to fares, operations structure and the strategic interaction among
airlines. The conclusions of each of these models appear coherent to similar research published
in the topic. Furthermore, the models presented can also be used to explain the recent
developments in the industry, thus bolstering the applicability of the models.
The theoretical model developed while analyzing the effect of liberalization on fares
showed that in routes that connect a hub to a hub, lead to a fare decrease, whereas on other less
lucrative routes, fares tend to increase. Granting market access to more carriers gives them the
option to operate or not on routes they desire. Thus, more competition is seen on lucrative routes,
which leads to a downward pressure on fares. At the same time, routes where flights were forced
to be operated under the regulated regime will witness an increase in fares because fewer carriers
will operate there. Since private airlines are profit maximizers, they have no obligation to
conduct flights to provide public utility to people. These conclusions are consistent with the
findings of Morrison and Winston who claim that air fares do not decrease in all markets due to
deregulation. Empirical evidence to support these claims was discussed in the section.
The model developed to assess the cost efficiency of adopting a hub and spoke flight
operation structure in a liberalized market showed that airlines will eventually adopt such a
structure in comparison to the point to point structure. Findings by Morrison and Winston also
show the same results. Furthermore, the model’s findings are supported by the recent changes
commercial airlines are making today. Many have adopted the hub and spoke regime, and
replaced their aircraft inventory with bigger jets to satisfy market demand.
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Modeling the strategic behavior of firms using Stackelberg and Cournot games showed
that there is a strong incentive for airlines to collude in a liberalized market where antitrust
immunity is granted. Recent developments in the industry show that more and more airlines are
joining alliances. However, it should be noted that liberalization has two kinds of effects on
airline alliances: antitrust immunity allows alliances to form, but providing complete access to all
international markets may make alliances vestigial; airlines will no longer need to codeshare
with alliance partners to gain access to non liberalized markets.
Although the models presented are theoretical, the results are consistent with the
developments in the airline industry, some of which have been discussed in the thesis. Their
applicability may also be tested in examining how ASEAN open skies will change the dynamics
of the airline industry in the region. This, of course, would be a topic of future research.
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